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Federal/Civil 
Timely 
1 ~ SUMMARY: Resps, eight black bricklayers, brought 
suit under Title VII and§ 1981 against petr, a mason con-
tractor specializing in refractory installation in steel mills 
and blast furnace relining; they charged that they bad been 
denied access to petr's employment process on account of their 
ra~e. The DC (Austin) granted petr's motion to dismiss filed 
at the close of all evidence on the ground that petr had proven 
- 2 -
beyond all reasonable doubt that it did not engage in either 
racial discrimination or retaliatory conduct in its employ-
ment practices on the job in question. The CA 7 reversed as 
to three of the resps, holding that they had established 
racial discrimination under the principle of McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ·Petr seeks review of that 
decision, contending that it is in conflict with the Court's 
recent decisions in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 
45 U.S.L.W. 4882 (June 27, 1977), and International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 4506 (May 31, 1977). 
2. FACTS: Petr contracted .in August 1971 with Interlake , 
Inc., to reline the blast furnace at Interlake's Chicago plant. 
Because of the time pressures of the job and the need for the ----------~ 
work to be performed properly in order to avoid the risk of ex-
plosion while the furnace is operating, petr was expected to hire 
the most skilled and experienced fire bricklayers it could obtain. 
Petr hired Joe Dacies as job brick superintendent; he was given 
complete authority regarding selection, hiring, and retention of 
bricklayers. In accordance with what petr says is industry 
practice, Dacies refused to hire bricklayers at the gate or to 
take applications from those who came to the gate.. Instead he 
hired off of a list of bricklayers with whom he had worked on 
previous jobs and in whom he had confidence. All of the bricklaye: -
on this list were white. 
Because of past charges of dis~rimination on jobs in 





all possible, of 16 per cent of the bricklaying force black." 
Dacies was directed to follow this policy; in order to do so, 
------------------., 
he sought recommendations of qualified black bricklayers from 
his general foreman, a black employee, and another Furnco 
superintendent in the area. Among the blacks that Dacies hired 
were six men who had been plaintiffs in an earlier discrimination 
suit against petr; they were hired after settlement negotiations 
between the parties had broken off. The result of the hiring for 
the Interlake job was that black bricklayers worked 13.3 per cent -
of the "man-days" worked on the job o (The percentage is measured 
in terms of man-days because the bricklayers were hired at various 
times; as the CA 7 pointed out, laying firebrick on this type of 
job is considered lucrative, and the earlier a bricklayer was 
hired, the longer he had an opportunity to work.) 
Resps' suit contended that petr's hiring practices, and 
especially its policy of refusing to hire at the gate, were 
racially discriminatory. Six of the resps had attempted to ~secure 
I ,, 
employment with petr by appearing at the jobsite gate; while none ------------"-------.. 
was hired in that manner, three of them were eventually hired for 
the job. One other resp, who had not applied at the gate, was 
also hired. 
3. DECISIONS BELOW: The DC granted petr's motion to 
.--
dismiss, finding not only that resps had failed to prove their 
----.;. 
case but also that petr had proven what it was not required to, 
i.e., that it had not engaged in racial discrimination in its 







The DC found that petr's hiring policies of not hiring at the 
·gate, not accepting written applications, and only hiring as 
bricklayers those whom the superindendent knew to be highly 
competent were racially neutral on their face and were applied 
c...,~~ 
equally to both bl~cks and whites. Not only was there no showing ...... ~..., ....... .__ 
of a disproportionate impact, but on the contrary the DC concluded 
that the hiring policies resulted i.n a percentage of black brick-
layers on the job far in excess of the percentage of black brick-
layers in the relevant labor market (5.7 per cent). The DC also 
concluded that resps had failed to prove a case of discrimination 
l.lllder McDonnell Douglas, for even if they were qualified, petr's 
failure to hire them was pursuant to its legitimate and nondis-
criminatory hiring policies which were justified as a business 
necessity. 
The CA 7 sustained the DC's judgment as to five of the 
resps. As for the other three, the court concluded that they had 
established racial discrimination. Applying the test set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas, supra, the CA stated that they belonged to a 
racial minority, they did all they could to apply, they were 
qualified for the jobs which were about to be open, they were re-
fused consideration (although not permanently in one case), and 
thereafter the petr sought out and employed persons of similar 
qualifications. The court disagreed with the DC's acceptance of 
petr's argument that a valid business reason justified its failure 
to hire at the gate. It said that there was a reasonable alterna-




methods -- written application could be accepted at the gate, 
with inquiry as to qualifications and experience; the appli-
cant's c1aims could then be checked out and compared with the 
qualifications and experience of those on the list. In response 
to petr's argument that its hiring methods were not racially 
discriminatory, the court stated: "The historical inequality of - -
treatment of black workers seems to us to establish that it is 
prima facie racial discrimination to refuse to consider the 
qualifications of a black job seeker before hiring from an ap-
proved list containing only the names of white bricklayers." 
Finally,, the CA rejected petr's argument that the hiring statistic E: 
relied on by the DC rebutted any inference of racial discriminatior 
~-1 
''Where the percentage of minority members 
in a workforce is lower than the group 
considered, that fact may well indicate 
the operation of racial discrimination. 
Absence of such discrimination is not 
proved by the percentage in the workforce 
being higher than the percentage in the 
group considered." 
4 .. CONTENTIONS: (1) Petr contends that the CA 7 's 
rejection of the statistical showing as proof that petr's policies 
were not discriminatory is concary to che approach taken by t he 
Court last Term in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 
supra. In that case, petr contends, the Court concluded that a 
statistical comparison between the minority representation in the 
skilled labor force capable of performing the work in question and 
the minority representation in the employer's work force is clearl~ 
probative of whether the employer has .engaged in hiring discrimin-
ation. 
- 6 -
(2) Petr argues that the CA 7's decision is also 
in conflict with another decision of last Term, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, supra. There the 
Court noted that in an employment discrimination suit alleging 
disparate treatment, as opposed to disparate impact, "[p]roof 
of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some 
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in 
treatment." Petr points out that the CA 7's opinion is devoid 
of any finding of discriminatory intent or motive. 
(3) Finally, petr argues that the CA 7 usurped the 
functions of the DC by substituting its own judgment for that of 
the DC as to the legitimacy, job relatedness, and business 
necessity of petr's hiring practices. 
5. DISCUSSION: Petr raises some serious questions about 
the decision below. In the Teamsters decision, supra, the Court 
discussed the two types of employment discrimination suits: 
(1) "disparate treatment" in which the employer is alleged to "have 
treated some people less favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and (2) "disparate -----
i~ t" in which it is alleged that employment practices which are -facially neutral in their treatment of different groups in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justifiec 
by business necessity. In the former case, "[p]roof of discrimin-
atory motive is critical," whereas in the latter, such proof is not 
required. 45 U.S.L.W., at 4509 n. 15. 
- 7 
The basis for this suit seems to me to fit more closely 
into the disparate impact category, for the CA 7 noted that the 
"seeming ,equality of treatment [of black and white applicants by 
petr] is deceptive." However, as the CA apparently recognized, 
there are problems with basing the suit on this theory, the main 
problem being that no disparate impact was proven. If anything, 
it was shown that petr's hiring practices resulted in a greater 
number of black bricklayers than otherwise would have been expec ed. 
The CA 7 instead found that the three resps had proven 
racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas test, which I 
interpret as falling within the disparate treatment category. This 
basis also seems questionable, for it is not at all clear that 
petr treated black and white applicants differently. No one wa 
hired at the gate; all were hired on the basis of subjective 
recommendations and referrals. While petr's methods of hiring may - - - ....._...--
have been arbitrary, I question whether they were shown to be 
racially discriminatory. 
What the CA 7 really seems to have done is to have concluded 
that the subjective hiring methods employed by petr 
racially discriminatory. If that is the real basis 
sion, then it is in conflict with the CA S's decision in Hester v. 
Southern Railway Co., 497 F.2d 1374 (CA 5 1974). There the court 
held that "nonvalidated tests and subjective hiring procedures are 
not violative of Title VII per~· Title VII comes into play only 
when such practices result in discrimination. At that point, the 




satisfactory justification for his procedures." In that case 
the CA S concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove the 
resulting discrimination, and thus the DC had erred in finding 
a Title VIi violation. 
Because this case looks like a possible grant, I would 
call for a response. 
There is no response. 
10/17/77 
ME 
Gibson Opin~on in Petn. 
I agree that there are problems in this case. Two fea t ures 
of petr's hiring practtces seemed to disturb CA7. First, those 
blacks who were hired tended to be hired later than the whites who 
were hired;---,:ience, they did--!l.9..! . wot:k a s. many days as the whites. 
Petr's response to this is that the total number of man-days worked 
by blacks was greater than the proportion of the work-force that 
was black; hence, blacks got their fiir share of the pie. This . 
may or may not be right. One could argue that discriminatory impac~ 
is present because the blacks' man-days were divided among a 
greater numher of blacks,~ that on average each black who was 
hired worked fewer ~aks · than each wni te '; , A 1 though CA 7 was not 
very explicit, I thin t~is part of what bothered it. I do 
not think any of the Court's cases answer the question whether 
this kind of disparate impact is actionable under Title VU.. 
Second, CA7 was disturbed by the fact that only those blacks I 
who came to Dacies' attention through his own contacts were hired. 4~ I do not see this as a problem, since only those whites who came O · to Dacies' attention through his own experience were hired, too. 
What CA7 may have been getting at was that petr placed a ceiling 
on the number of blacks it would recruit, but its opinion is 
awfully obscure on this point. See Pet.App.A at A8-A9. 
It seems to me that CA7 may have been right to be bothered 
by the first point, but it did not explain it very well. Although 
I have my doubts as to whether this particular problem arises often 
I just don't know the case probably merits a CFR, discuss, and 
join 3. ____......_ --.___ 
To: Mr. Justice November 10, 1977 
From: Jim Alt 
Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters~ ember~ 
1977 Conference List - discuss) ~- -:-----
Re: No. 77-369, 
2 
The response for which you called is in. Resp contends: 
(1) The decision below does not conflict with Hazelwood, 
because "nowhere does the Seventh Circuit suggest that the use 
of statistic-:S in an employment discrimination lawsuit is a -
one-way street." Response at 5. This is difficult to square with 
CA7's statement that "Absenee of . . . discrimination is not 
proved by the percentage [of blacks] in the workforce being 
higher than the percentage fof blacks] in the group considered 
[for employment]." Pet.App. A at A8. Resp goes on to argue 
th,at the foreman's hiring list, which contained only the names 
of whites, was compiled in an "obviously discriminatory manner;" 
and that "maintenance of that list becomes no less of an 
exclusionary device because, long after plaintiffs applies 
2. 
for work, some blacks are transferred in." Ibid. The first point 
has not been accepted by either the DC or the CA; neither 
hinted that the foreman intentionally excluded blacks from his 
hiring list. The second point is the one that I think got to 
.. 
CA7: the fact that even though blacks ended up working 13.3% 
of the total hours on the job, they were hired later than 
whites so that each black worked fewer hours. 
(2) Resp also contends the decision below does not conflict 
with Teamsters v. U.S., for two reasons. First, petr contends 
that its practice is neutral on its face because neither blacks 
it claims, 
nor whites are hired at the gate; hence,/no intent to discriminate 
is apparent. But the "disparate treatment" of which resp complains 
is not the refusal to hire at the gate, but rather the hiring of ~; 
most of the workers from an all-white list. 
Second, to the extent that discriminatory motive must be 
shown, Teamsters said that such motive can "be inferred from the 
mere fact of differences in treatment." Such difference in 
treatment is shown here because the foreman never put the 
name of any black on his hiring list. 
I am not quite sure what point resp is trying to make 
here. I think it comes back to the claim that the foreman 
acted in a discriminatory manner when he compiled his hiring 
list. But as I have said, neither court below accepted or 
went off on that claim. 
(3) Resp contends the CA properly rejected the DC's 
finding that use of the hiring list was justified by legitimate 
business reasons o This is so because, as the CA said, 
an alternative to using the hiring list would be to accept 
applications from all comers and then to check out their 
qualifications. 
DISCUSSION: My view of this case has not changed. CA7 ---- -- -was disturbed by the fact that each black worked fewer hours 
than his white counterpart, and by the fact that the employer 
apparently set some kind of quota on the number of blacks it 
would hire when it set out to recruit blacks o But the fact ...__ 
remains that the DC found that use of the hiring list was 
justified by legitimate business reasons, and that it also 
found that the employer's hiring practices were not 
discriminatory in either intent or effect. The case still 
3. 
is problematical; but whether it presents a problem of widespread 
imporaance is a matter of doubt to me. I would favor a deny or 
join 3. 
JA 
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BOB-TAIL BENCH MEMO 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy Bregstein April 16, 1978 
RE: No. 77-369, Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters 
This case should not have been granted. Both 
courts below failed to do their jobs, and neither the dist 
ct's decision nor the CA's decision reversing the dist ct 
applies correct legal theory. The dist ct's failure to 
understand the proof requirements in a Title VII action 
resulted in an inadequate record, which caused the CA to go 
off on its own theory of the case (without adequately 
explaining its factual predicate) and which makes it very 
hard, if not impossible, for this Court to review the 
decisions below. 
2. 
The CA decided this case on the theory of 
disparate treatment under McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973), but did not fully explain its theory 
on this rationale. Petr now argues to this Court that this 
is not a McDonnell Douglas case but a Griggs case (Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Resps argue that 
the result below can be sustained under either McDonnell 
Douglas or Griggs, but urge this Court to remand if it 
finds no violation under McDonnell Douglas because the CA 
did not consider a Griggs theory and therefore there is 
nothing on that score for this Court to review. 
Alternatively, resps argue on three grounds that this case 
should be DIG'd. 
Finally, to make things even more complicated the 
'-- SG argues that the judgment below should be affirmed as to 
two of the resps (Smith and Samuels) but reversed as to the 
third (Nemhard). This is because intentional 
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas was established as 
to Smith and Samuels but not as to Nemhard, and no Griggs 
violation was established at all. 
In a very brief memo--because of time constraints 
and the fact that the long-range significance of this case 
is almost nil--I will give you my ba~ic impressions. I 
have not spent much time trying to unravel the facts of 
this case, and to determine what was and was not argued and 
proved below, because of inadequate time. 
I. McDonnell Douglas 
Under McDonnell Douglas, all three resps made out 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Each of them 
showed 
3. 
"{i) that he belongs to a racial minority; {ii) 
that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; {iii) 
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; 
and {iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications. 11 1 
At that point it was up to Furnco to rebut the prima facie 
case by articulating "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection." 411 U.S., at 802. 
Here Furnco says it rebutted the prima facie case by 
showing that thre were two legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons why resps were not hired: (1) Furnco {through 
Dacies, the supervisor) did not take applications at the 
gate; and (2) Furnco only hired people its supervisor 
{here, Dacies) knew to be qualified bricklayers and with 
whom he had worked previously. 
The next step in the McDonnell Douglas case is for 
the plaintiffs to show that the reasons given by the 
employer were mere pretexts hiding a racially 
1. Technically, Furnco was not "seeking applicants" 
because its hiring methodd did not use applications but 
relied on the knowledge of the superintendent of qualified 
bricklayers with whom he had worked previously. If the 
particular word "applicants" is dispositive, then resps did 
not even make out a prima facie case. For purposes of this 
memo, I will assume that "applicants" also could mean "new 
employees" who would be hired according to whatever method 
the employer used. 
: 
; 
discriminatory reason. The SG argues, and resps seem 
agree, that resps did prove pretext as to Smith and - - - --
4. 
S~ u:.:1 · They say that plaintiffs introduced evidence that 
Davies had worked with Smith and Samuels on previous jobs; 
they therefore qualified as bricklayers with whom Dacies 
had worked and whom he knew to be qualified. (Indeed, 
Smith eventually was hired.) Once Smith and Samuels showed 
up at the gate, therefore, Dacies' refusal to hire them 
constituted racial discrimination. I am not exactly sure 
whether resps are saying that the discrimination occurred 
when Dacies refused to hire them when they showed up at the 
gate or when he failed to include their names in his "list" 
of qualified bricklayers with whom he had worked. 
If we are talking about disparate treatment, i.e., 
racially motivated refusal to hire a qualified individual 
because of his race, then it would seem to me that even if 
the failure to place Smith and Samuels on Dacies' list in 
the first place was not discriminatory, the failure to hire 
them when they showed up at the gate probably was. This 
would not apply to Nemhard, however, because it is conceded 
that he never worked with Dacies before. 
The problem with this whole theory is that the 
underlying facts are disputed. Furnco contends that there 
is no evidence that Dacies worked with Samuels in the past, 
and it contends that although he worked on some of the same 
jobs with Smith, it is unclear whether they knew each 




job where Dacies worked under him, but Furnco contests 
this.) As for the intentional discrimination worked by the 
failure to put Samuels' and Smith's names on Dacies' list, 
Furnco seems to be saying that there could have been any 
number of reasons why Davies did not have Smith on his list 
of qualified bricklayers. The problem is that it is 
conceded that there were no names of black bricklayers on 
Dacies' list. Again, however, we have no evidence of how 
many black bricklayers worked with Dacies before, what his 
motivation was in making up this list, whether qualified 
white bricklayers with whom he had worked in the past were 
omitted from the list, etc. The all-white list looks very 
suspicious, but we really do not know much about how it 
came about. If it was resps' burden to show that the 
refusal to hire at the gate was a pretext, it seems to me 
it was their burden to introduce some of this missing 
evidence. On the other hand, it could be that proof of 
Dacies' failure to place any black names on his list 
satisfied resps' burden. 
Resps make one other argument to show that the 
refusal to hire at the gate was a pretext and indeed that 
Furnco's representation that it never hires at the gate is 
false. They say that black bricklayers obtained work on 
previous Furnco jobs by applying at the gate. As a matter 
of fact, it is said that another Furnco supervisor 
(Urbanski) told one of the resps about the Interlake job 
(at issue here) and suggested to him that he might obtain 
6. 
work on it by applying at the gate. Again, these facts are 
disputed; Furnco says it was its own practice and industry 
practice not to accept applications at the gate. 
~'t 
In short, the McDonnell Douglas case is  
troublesome because the facts are so unclear. And in ~
concluding that plaintiffs had made out a winning case o~ #( ~ 
disparate treatment, the CA neither distinguished between ~.,ll.,14t,, 
Smith and Samuels on the one hand and Nemhard on the other 
nor reached the third step in the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis (whether the supposedly non-discriminatory reason 
for the refusal to hire in fact was a pretext). Instead, 
it shifted gears and concluded that there was no business 
necessity, under Griggs, for Furnco's hiring procedures. 
Thus we do not have the benefit of the CA's view on whether 
the refusal to hire Smith or Samuels was a pretext. I do 
not feel comfortable having this Court resolve that 
question. The CA's conclusion that there was no need for 
Furnco's hiring method might be read as a conclusion that 
it was a pretext, but it did not say so and this was not 
its analytical framework, once it had shifted to 
considerations under Griggs. 
II. Griggs 
Assuming that there was no disparate treatment, 
the analysis shifts to whether a facially neutral hiring 
policy had a disproportionate impact on blacks under 
Griggs. Here I would tend to agree with resps that the CA 
should consider this question in the first instance. Here 
the question would be whether the refusal to take 
applications at the gate and the method of having the 
supervisor hire people he knew to be capable had a 
disproportionate impact on blacks. 
7. 
Again, analysis of this question is complicated by 
the fact that we do not really know what went on. In 
addition, petr and resps go at the question in totally 
different ways. Petr says we should look at the fact that 
there was no disproportionate impact of its over-all hiring 
procedure, which included not only Dacies' use of his list 
but also the instructions from Furnco to Dacies to try to 
hire 16% blacks on the job. Resps, on the other hand, says 
that Dacies' list was the main way of hiring, and the 
\., _ _..,. directive to hire blacks was just an after-thought when 
Furnco realized it might be in trouble for not having an 
integrated work force. Resps also dispute the relevant 
percentage of blacks in the relevant labor force (they say 
it's about 13§ whereas petr, citing a federal study, say it 
is 5.7%), and the percentage of blacks hired for the 
Interlake job. Resps say that petr's 16% figure is 
distorted because some of the black bricklayers were 
transferred from another Furnco job. 
It is very silly and a waste of time for the Court 
to have to resolve these disputes because the courts below 
failed to do it correctly. Assuming that the percentage of 
black workers on the Interlake was higher than the 
percentage in the relevant labor force, as the dist ct 
found, it is hard to accept resps' theory without making a 
8 • 
finding that the hiring of blacks for the Interlake job was 
a sham. In fact, the minority workers worked 13.3% of the 
man-days on the job: and whites worked an average of 34.05 
days while blacks worked an average of 32.5 days. This 
would not prove a case of disproportionate impact under 
Griggs. Yet resps are right that it would be inconsistent 
with Title YII principles to say that an employer complies 
with the law by using an exclusively white hiring list as 
his basic method of hiring but then supplements his work 
force, later, by hiring a number of blacks. In short, the 
parties do not seem to disagree on the legal principles but 
interpret the facts differently. 
III. The grounds for a DIG 
I think this case should be dismissed as 
improvidently granted. As is apparent from the above 
discussion, there is no law here for the Court to figure 
out, and the decision will not result in the articulation 
........... 
of any new pr'nci les. The case is extremely fact-specific 
and we do not have a good view of the facts. In addition 
to the fact that the case requires much sorting of unique 
facts and no potential for legal development, resps point 
out that none of the questions supposedly presented really 
is presented. 
9 • 
(1) The first question presented deals with 
whether a CA can find statistics showing no 
disproportionate impace irrelevant. The answer to this 
question is obvious: of course it can't. But here the CA 
must have bought resps' view of the case: that the basic 
hiring took place off of Dacies' list and the addition of 
black workers later was a sham. This assessment of the 
facts may or may not be correct, but their is no novel 
principle involved. In addition, the Court already has 
said that statistics are not conclusive, and that a showing 
of a racially balanced work force will not be an absolute 
defense to a conclusion of disparate treatment (~., 
racially motivated discrimination against an individual). 
That is what the CA purported to find in this case. 
(2) The second question is whether a court can 
find disparate treatment without finding discriminatory 
motive. I agree with resps that this is a semantic ploy. 
A conclusion of disparate treatment necessarily contains a 
finding of discriminatory motive because of the proof 
required. If the plaintiff proves that the supposedly non-
discriminatory reason for the refusal to hire was a 
pretext, by implication he has proved that the real reason 
was racially discriminatory. 
(3) The third question is a rehash of the first: 
whether a violation of Title VII under Griggs can be shown 
without a showing of disproportionate impact. Again, the 
answer is clear: Of course it can't. But here the parties 
10. 
simply disagree on the facts of which statistics should 
have been used, which black workers should have been 
counted, and whether Dacies' list or the overall hiring was 
the relevant hiring method to focus on; they do not 
disagree about the controlling principle. This last 
question might be certworthy if this kind of thing happened 
frequently and if the facts were clear, but neither is true 
here. 
Accordingly, I would DIG. This is not because the 
decision below is right but because the case will not 
result in the announcement of any new principles and it is 
a mess. If the case is not DIG'd, I will have to take a 
closer look at the facts to come up with the correct 
result. My sense is that there was no Griggs violation 
'-----' (because the figures showed no disproportionate impact and 
resps' theory about the hiring of some blacks as an 
afterthought does not seem to have been adopted by the CA); 
but there may have been disparate treatment of Samuels or 
Smith. 
N.B. 
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j;u:p:umt <!fourl o-f flrt~h j;taug 
'JIUl'rudp:nght~ J. <!f. 2!1ffe'l,' 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. June 5, 1978 
RE: No. 77-369 Furnco Construction v. Waters 
Dear Bill: 
I will await the dissent. I find the discussion 
of the business necessity doctrine very troublesome. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.Sup-rtntt <!Jourl qf Urt ~h' ~faug 
Jf ag }ringhtn. ~. QJ. 2llffe >!' 
June 5, 1978 
No. 77-369 - Furnco v. Waters 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion 
for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
;§up-untt (!fcttrl cf tq~ ~ttiu~ ~htlts 
'J)JlUlltmgfott. ~. (!f. 20ffe>!$ 
June 8, 1978 V 
Re: No. 77-369 - Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
; 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy June 12, 1978 
RE: Furnco Ccnstr. Corp. v. Waters--WHR's opinion 
I think the opinion is okay on the McDonnell Douglas 
issues. It x.emaRaxxxsxxkexRA: disagrees with the CA on the 
question whet~r the employer offered a legitimate reason 
explaining the failure to hire resps; but it remands to the 
CA for consideration of the question whether the reason was 
a pretext. This is good, because it lets resps argue a that 
Dacies' use of the all-white list shows that his hiring 
method was a pretext for the exclusion of blacks. 
I am uncomfortable, however, with WHR's treatment of 
Griggs. The CA did not discuss the Griggs argument, while 
the dist ct concluded that Furnco's hiring practices are 
·ustified by "business necessity" • .Rex Resps' brief states 
that the Griggs argument was briefed aid argued before the CA ~ ; 
Yet WHR's opinion seems to exclude Griggs analysis completely 
from this case. He does this in two ways. In his footnote 8, 
in which he mentions alternative theories of the case that 
were not considered by the CA but are to be considered on remand, 
he discusses only McDonnell Douglas points. More importantly, 
sentence of Part II-A (on p. 7) says that this is 
a McDonnell Douglas case. And it also seems to say that plaintiffs 
cannot base their case on Griggs if they do not allege use of 
employment tests, particularized requirements such as height or 
2. 
weight, or a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. '!he 
inclusion of this sentence makes it seem like WHR is intentionally 
excluding Griggs analysis from this case. 
I think this is wrong. Plaintiffs ax seem to have 
based their case alternatively on McDonnell Douglas and Griggs. 
And the infamous "all-white list" could be used as evidence 
under either theory. Under McDonnell Douglas, it would be used 
to show that the supposedly legitimate hiring practice of 
not htring at the gate was pretextual. Under Griggs, plaintiffs -would attempt to show that use of Dacies' hiring practice 
xeKHlxeaxiR had a disproportionate impact on minorities. 
Whether they would prevail is questionable--resolution of the 
question would depend in part on the CA's decision as to the 
proper focus. Plaintiffs argue that use of the all-white list 
resulted in the kxi hiring of!!£ blacks; Furnco, on the other 
hand, says the proper focus is on the total hiring policy, 
?'--
which was broader that Dacies' all-white list. In other words, 
the list was not the exclusive method of hiring; and under 
the total kx hiring policy, there was not a disproportionate 
impact on klakx blacks. (Seep. 8 of my bench memo.) I 
kRe& tend to think RHR Furnco would prevail on the Griggs 
question; and the SG agreed that plaintiffs would not prevail -
on Griggs. But the issue should not be foreclosed by this 
Court; the CA should be instructed to consider plaintiffs' 
Griggs argument on remand. '!his is not just a matter of 
disposing of this caee correctly; the first sentence in Part II-A 
will have a broader impact on future Title VII litigation. 
3. 
(Mike Young) 
I tried to get in touch with WHR's clerk/about this, 
but he was out of town. XXHSHla (He'll be back tomorrow.) 
I would like to find out whether the exclusion of Griggs 
was intentional, and, if so, wkexkax why WHR thinks Griggs 
analysis can't be used in this case. If they insist on 
keeping the opinion this way, I would recommend that you 
dissent on this point. I've spoken to WJB's and TM's clerks 
about this, and this is the ground on which they intend to 
dissent. (Tiley are not dissenting on the "business necessity" 
point, as indicated in WJB's letter to WHR. Upon further 
correctly 
reflection, they realized/that business necessity is irrelevant 
under McDonnell Douglas.) BRW's clerk also believes that 
the exclusion of Griggs is wrong. 




No. 77-369 Furnco v. 
Dear Bill: 
It would help me if you wouJd consider favorably 
the following. l 
Commence Part II-A (p. 7) of your opjnion with 
words "We agree ••• " in the 8th line of the fjrst 
paragraph. 
Then drop into a footnote the references to 
Griggs, Albemarle and Dothard, simply omitting the word 
"Since" (in two places) so that our agreement that 
McDonnell Douglas controls does not appear to be predicated 
on the fact that none of the situations involved in Griggs, 
Albermarle or Dothard is present here. 
As I have said before, I do not think Griggs has 
any applicability to this case in view of the findings by 
the District Court that were not questioned by CA7. But 
there is no real reason to say anything about Griggs. 
If these negligible changes are agreeable to you, 







.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtntt <!}autt gf tlft ~tb ~taus 
-~!rhtghm. J. <!}. 2llffe'k' 
June 19, 1978 
Re: No. 77-369 Furnco v. Waters 
Dear Lewis: 
The proposed changes contained in your letter of 
June 17th are agreeable to me, and I have likewise cleared 
them with Potter and Harry, who joined the earlier draft. 
I will accordingly send the necessary revisions to the Printer, 
and hope to have a new draft incorporating your changes in 
circulation as soon as possible. 
Sincerely/ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
'11',) .), 
(,· .. 
June )9, 1978 
;( No. 77-369 Furnco v. waters 
Dear Bill: ~. -1 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Rehnqujst 
lfp/ss 
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CHAM BERS OF 
JU S TI CE WILLIAM H. R E HN Q UI S T 
.:§u.prtnu Qio-ttrl llf Hp~ ~trift h ~htb>J3' 
~ tt.$' fri:n.g um, 10 . <!J. 2.(lgi J!-2 
June 19, 1978 
Re: No. 77-369 Furnco v. Waters 
Dear Lewis: 
The proposed changes contained in your letter of 
June 17th are agree able to me , and I have likewise cleared 
them with Potter and Ha rry, who joine d the earlier draft. 
I will accordingly send the necessary revisions to the Printer, 
and hope to have a new draft incorporating your changes in 
circulation as soon as possible. 
Sincerely~ 












Mr. , ust hvart 
Mr. J 1 Ltiiv .te 
?fr. Jupt 1 . fo.rshall 
Mr. Just·ce Black'llun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Beoiroulatad: JUN 2 0 1978 
Furnco Construction Corporation,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Sev-
William Waters et al. enth Circuit. 
[June -, 1978] 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondents are three bla.ck bricklayers who sought 
employment with petitioner Furnco Construction Corpora-
tion. Two of the three were never offered employment. The 
third was employed only long after he initially applied. 
Upon adverse findings entered after a bench trial, the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that 
respondents had not proved a cla.im under either the "dis-
parate treatment" theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U. S. 792 ( 1973), or the "disparate impact" theory 
of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U. S. 424 (1971). The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, concluding that 
under McDonnell Douglas respondents had made out a prima 
facie case which had not been effectively rebutted, reversed 
the judgment of the District Court. We granted certiorari 
to consider important questions raised by this case regarding 
the exact scope of the prima facie case under McDonnell 
Douglas and the nature of the evidence necessary to rebut 
such a case. - U. S. - (1977). Having concluded that 
the Court of Appeals erred in its treatment of the latter ques-
tion, we reverse and remand to that court for further pro-
~eedings consistent with this opinion. 
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I 
A few facts in this case are not in serious dispute. Peti-
tioner Furnco, an employer within the meaning of § § 701 (b) 
and (h) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, specializes 
in refractory installation in steel mills and, more particularly, 
the rehabilitation or relining of blast furnaces with what is 
called in the trade "firebrick." Furnco does not, however, 
maintain a permanent force of bricklayers. Rather, it hires a 
superintendent for a specific job and then delegates to him 
the task of securing a competent work force. In August 1971, 
Furnco contracted with Interlake, Inc., to reline one of its 
blast furnaces. Joseph Daci~, who had been a job superin-
tendent for Furnco since 1965, was placed in charge of the job 
,and given the attenclent hiring responsibilities. He did not 
accept applications at the jobsite, but instead hired only 
persons whom he knew to be experienced and competent in 
this type of work or persons who had been recommended to 
him as similarly skilled. He hired his first four bricklayers; 
all of whom were white, on two successive days in August, the 
26th and 27th, and two in September, the 7th and 8th. On 
September 9 he hired the first bla.ck bricklayer. By Septem-
ber 13, he had hired eight more bricklayers, one of whom was 
black; by September 17, seven more had been employed, 
another of whom was black; and by September 23, 17 more 
were on the payroll, a.gain with one black included in that 
number.1 Between October 12 to 18, he hired six bricklayers, 
all of whom were black, including respondent Smith, who had 
worked for Dacies previously and had applied a,t the jobsite 
somewhat earlier. Respondents Samuels and Nemhard were, 
not hired, though they were fully qualified and had also at-
1 Respondents contend that two of these four blacks were not actually 
"hired," but merely "transferred " from another Furnco job. Brief for 
R&ipondents 7- 8. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals spoke-
only of "hiring" bricklayers, however, and t hose pa,rts of the record to which 
res_ponq.f,~ntf;i J?Oint do not r ei:su,Hle t!I> that tti ii, ·is a mischaracteriza.tion. 
' . . ,,, 
; 
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tempted to secure employment by appearing at the jobsite 
gate. Out of the total of 1819 man-days worked on the Inter-
lake job, 242, or 13.3;{, were worked by black bricklayers. 
Many of the remaining facts found by the District Court 
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are in some dispute 
between the parties, but none was expressly found by the 
Court of Appeals to be clearly erroneous. The District Court 
elaborated at some length as to the "critical" necessity of 
insuring that only experienced and highly qualified fire-
bricklayers were employed. Untimely work would result in 
substantial losses both to Interlake, which was forced to shut 
down its furnace and lay off employees during the relining 
job, and to Furnco, which was paid for this work at a fixed 
price and for a fixed time period. In addition, not only might 
shoddy work slow this work process down, but it also might 
necessitate costly future maintenance work with its attendant 
loss of production and employee layoffs; diminish Furnco's 
reputation and ability to secure similar work in the future; 
and perhaps even create serious safety hazards, leading to 
explosions and the like. Pet. for Cert. A13-A15. These con-
siderations justified Furnco's refusal to engage in on-the-job 
training or to hire at the gate, a hiring process which would 
not provide an adequate method of matching qualified applica-
tions to job requirements and assuring that the applicants 
are sufficiently skilled and capable. Id., at A18-A19·. Fur-
thermore, there was no evidence that these policies and 
practics were a pretext to exclude black bricklayers or were 
otherwise illegitimate or had a disproportionate impact or 
effect on black bricklayers. Pet. for Cert. A17-A18. From 
late 1969 through late 1973, 5.7%, of the bricklayers in the 
relevant labor force were minority group members, see 41 
CFR § 60--11 et seq.,2 while, as mentioned before, 13.3% of 
2 Respondents attempted to introduce a study conducted in late 1973 by 
the local union which matched members' names and race in an effort to 
show what percentage of the :union membership was black. The study 
77-369-0PINION 
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the man-days on Furnco's Interlake job were worked by black 
bricklayers. 
Because of the above considerations and following the es-
tablished practice in the industry, most of the fire-bricklayers 
hired by Dacies were persons known by him to be experienced 
and competent in this type of work. 'The others were hired 
after being recommended as skilled in this type of work by 
his general foreman, an em1:iloyee (a black), another Furnco 
superintendant in the area, and Furnco's General Manager 
John Wright. Wright had not only instructed Dacies to 
employ, as far as possible, at least 16% black bricklayers, a 
, policy due to Furnco's se1f-imposed affirmative action plan to 
insure that bla£:k bricklayers were employed by Furnco in 
Cook County in numbers stibstantially in excess of their per-
centage in the local union,3 but he had also recommended, in 
an effort to show good faith, that Dacies hire several specific 
bricklayers, \Vho had previously filed a discrimination suit 
concluded that approximately 500 of tlw 3,800 union members were black. 
The District Court excluded this evidence because the study had been 
conducted two yrars after Furnco completed its job. Pet. for Cert. A16 
n. 1. The Court, of Appeals thought rejection of this evidence was an 
abuse of discretion, but in dealing with the merits did not rely on the racial 
proportions in the labor force, so did not remand the case to permit intro-
duction of that testimony. The Court of Appeals also noted that in any 
event respondents suffered no prejudice by the court's refusal to admit the 
study because it would not have demonstrated discrimination. The study 
showed t.lmt 13.7% of the member~hip of the union was black, while the 
evidence demonstrated that 13.3% of the man-days were worked by black 
bricklayers, Furnco had set a goal of 16% black bricklayers, and 20% of 
the individuals hired were black. 551 F. 2d, at 1090. 
3 According to the District Court , this affirmative action program was 
initiated b:v Furnco following a job performed in 1969-1970 from which 
charges of racial discrimination in hiring were filed by several black 
bricklayers. These claims are apparently still pending on appeal in the 
Illinois courts and the merits of a parallel federal action remain to be 
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against Furnco, negotiations for the settlement of which had 
only recently broken down, see n. 3, supra. 
From these factual findings, the District Court concluded 
that respondents had failed to make out a Title VII claim 
under the doctrine of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra. 
Furnco's policy of not hiring at the gate was racially neutral 
on its face and there was no showing that it had a dispro-
portiona.te impact or effect,. Pet. for Cert. A20--A21. It also 
held that respondents had failed to prove a case of discrimina-
tion under McDonnell Douglas, supra. Pet. for Cert. A21. 
It is not entirely clear whet.her the court thought respondents 
had failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination 
under McDonnell Douglas, supra, see Pet .. for Cert. A20- A21 , 
but the court left no doubt that it thought Furnco's hiring 
practices and policies were justified as a "business necessity'1 
in that they were required for the safe and efficient operation 
of Funrco's business, and were "not used as a pretext to ex-
clude Negroes." Thus, even if a prima facie case had been 
made out. it had been effectively rebutted. Id., at A21. 
"Not only have Plaintiffs entirely failed to establish that 
Furnco's employment practices on the Interlake job dis-
criminated against them on the basis of race or consti-
tuted retaliatory conduct but Defendant has proven what 
it was not required to. By its cross-examination and 
direct evidence, Furnco has proven beyond all reasonable 
doubt that it did not engage in either racial discrimina-
tion or reta.liatory conduct in its employment practices in 
rega.rd to bricklayers on the Interlake job." 4 Pet. for 
Cert. A22. 
4 Tho District. Court abo found t hat. certain other plaintiffs never 
att,empted to apply for work Ht Interlake or were fired or not hired for 
valid reasons, such as insubordination or poor workmanship . Pct. for Cert . 
A17- Al9 . The Court of AppN1ls, concluding that 1hc Di:;trict Court 's 
findings were not clea rly erronrous, affirmed the judgment again:;t these 
particular pla intiffs. 551 F. 2.d, at 1087- 1088. These rulings are not . 
challeuged hen-: .. 
,",, 
.. ' 
.: . .... 
•.1· , . .. , 
~~ , 
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The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that respondents 
had made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, 
supra, at 802, which Furnco had not effectively rebutted. 
Because of the "historical inequality of treatment of black 
workers" '5 and the fact that the record failed to reveal that 
any whit~ persons had applied at the gate, the Court of 
Appeals rejected Furnco's argument that discrimination had 
not been shown because a white appearing at the jobsite 
would have fared no better than respondents. That court 
also disagreed with Furnco's contention, which the District 
'Court had adopted, "that the importance of selecting people 
whose capability had been demonstra,ted to defendant's brick 
superintendent is a 'legitima,te, nondiscriminatory reason' 
for defendant's refusal to consider plaintiffs." Id., at 1088. 
Instead, the appellate court proceeded to devise what it 
thought would be an appropriate hiring procedure for Furnco, 
saying ",[i] t seems to us that there is a reasonable middle, 
ground between immediate hiring decisions on the spot and 
seeking out employees from among those known to the super-
intendent." Tbid. This middle course, according to the Court 
of Appeals, was to take written applica.tions, with inquiry as 
to qualifications and experience, and then check, evaluate and 
compare those claims against the qualifications and experience 
of other bricklayers with whom the superintendent was already 
acquainted. We granted certiorari to consider whether the 
Court of Appeals had gone too far in substituting its own 
j'udgment as to proper hiring practices in the case of an 
fi The court stated: 
"The historical inequality of treatment of black workers seems to us to 
establish that it is prima facie racial discrimination to refuse to consider the 
qualifications of a black job seeker before hiring from an approved list 
containing only the names of white bricklayers. How else will qualified 
black applicants be able to overcome the racial imbalance in a particular 
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employer which claimed the practices it had chosen did not, 
violate Title VII.0 -U.S. - (1977). 
II 
A 
We a.gree with the Court of Appeals that the proper ap-
proach was the analysis contained in McDonnell Douqlas, 
supra.7 We also think the Court of Appeals was justified 
in concluding that as a matter of law respondents made out a 
prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. 
In that case we held that a plaintiff could make out a prima 
facie claim by showing: 
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he 
applied and was qualified for a job for which the em-
0 The petition for certiorari set out three questions: 
"l. Whether the Seventh Circuit, in reversing the judgment of the 
Dii;t.rict, Court, erred in finding as irrelevant to the issue of racial dis-
crimination in hiring, statistics demonstrating that in hiring highly skilled 
bricklayers, the employer hirrd Negroes in a percentage far in excess of 
their statistical presence in the relevant labor force. 
"2. Whether a court may find an employer guilty of racial discrimination 
in employment due to alleged disparate treatment in hiring without a 
finding of discriminatory intent or motive. 
"3. Whether a hiring practice not shown to result in dispnrate impact or 
treatment of prospective minority employees and found by the District 
Court to be justified by business necessity and legitimate business reasons 
may be found to be racially discriminatory by the Court of Appeals merely 
because it, is subjective and because the Court of Appeals substitutes its 
judgment for that of the District Court, as to what constitutes legitimate 
business reasons." Pet. for Cert. 2. 
7 This casr did not inYolve employment trsts , which we dealt with in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, and in Albemarle Paper Co . v. Moody, 
422 U. S. 405, 412-413 (1975). nor particularized requirements suc,h as 
the height and weight specifications considered in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
4;{3 P. S. :321, ;329 (1977), and ·it was not a "pattern or practicr" case 
Jikr International Brotherhood of 'l'eamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
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ployer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his quali~ 
fications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejec-
tion, the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applications from persons of complainant's 
qualification." 411 U.S., at 802 (footnote omitted). 
This, of course, was not intended to be an inflexible rule, as 
the Court went on to note that "[t]he facts necessarily will 
vary in Title VII cases, and the specification ... of the prima 
facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily appli-
cable in every respect to differing factual situation." Id., at 
802 n. 13. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, supra, a,t 358. But McDonnell Douglas did 
make clear that a 'Title VII plaintiff carries the initial burden 
of showing actions taken by the employer from which one can 
infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely 
than not that such actions were "based on a discriminatory 
criterion illegal under the Act." International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v. United States, supra, at 358. See also id., at 
335 n. 15. And here respondents carried that initial burden 
by proving they were members of a racial minority; they did 
everything within their power to apply for employment; 
Furnco has conceded that they were qualified in every respect 
for the jobs which were about to be open; " they were not 
offered employment, although Smith' later was, and; the em-
ployer continued to seek persons of similar qualifications. 
B 
We think the Court of Appeals went awry, however, in 
8 We note that this rase does not raise any questions regarding exactly 
what, sort of requirements an employer can impose upon any particular job. 
Furnco has conceded that for all its purpo::;e:; re:,;pondents were qualified in 
every sense. Thus, with respect to the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
case, the only question it places in issue is whether il;; refusal to considef' 
:re::;pondents' applications at the gate was based ·upon legitimate, nondis-
'Criminatory rea::;ons and therefore permissible. 
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ftpparently equating a prima facie showing under McDonnell 
Douglas with an ultimate finding of fact as to discriminatory 
refusal to hire under Title VII; the two are quite different 
I 
and that difference has a direct bearing on the proper resolu-
tion of this case. The Court of Appeals, as we read its opin-
ion, thought Furnico's hiring procedures not only must be 
reasonably related to the achievement of some legitimate pur-
pose, but also must be the method which allows the employer 
to consider the qualifica.tions of the largest number of minor-
ity applicants. We think the imposition of that second 
requirement simply finds no support either in the nature of 
the prima facie case or the purpose of Title VII. 
The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is 
always whether the employer is treating "some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin." International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States, supra, at 335 n. 15. The method sug-
gested in McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry, how-
ever, was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. 
Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the 
evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the· 
critical question of discrimination. A prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only 
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are 
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermis-
sible factors. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, supra, at 358 n. 44. And we are willing to pre-
sume this largely because we know from our experience that 
more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary 
manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a busi-
ness setting. Thus. when all legitimate reasons for rejecting 
an applicant have been elimina.ted as possible reasons for the 
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, 
whom we generally assume acts only with some reason, based 
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When the prima facie case is understood in the light of the 
opinion in McDonnell Dougla,s, it is apparent that the burden 
which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that 
he based his employment decision on a 'legitimate considera-
tion, and not au illegitimate one such as race. To prove that, 
he need not prove th~t he pursued the course which would 
both enable him to achieve his own business goal and allow 
him to consider the most employment applications. Title VII 
forbids him from having as a goal a work force selected by 
any proscribed discriminatory practice, but it does not impose 
a duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of 
minority employees. ·To dispel the adverse inference from a 
prima facie showing under JI.,[ cDonnell Douglas, the employer 
need only "art.iculate some legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the employee's rejection." M cDormell Douglas, supra, 
at 802. 
The dangers of embarking on a course such as that charted 
by the Court of Appeals here, where the court requires busi-
nesses to adopt what it perceives to be the "best" hiring pro-
cedures, ar<' nowhere more evident than in the record of this 
very case. :Not only docs the record not reveal that the 
court's suggested hiring procedure would work satisfactorily, 
but there is nothing in the record to indicate that it would be 
any less "haphazard. arbitrary, and subjective" than Furnco's 
method. which the Court of Appeals criticized as deficient for 
exactly those reasons. Courts are generally less competent 
than employers to restructure husiness practices, and unless 
mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it. 
This is not to say of course that proof of a justification 
which is reasonably related to the achievement of some legiti-· 
mate goal necessarily euds the inquiry. The plaintiff must be 
given the opportunity to introduce evidence that the proffered 
justification is merely a pretext for discrimination. And as 
we noted in McDminelr Douglas, supra, at 804-805, this evi-
dence might take a variety of forms. But the Court of 
Appeals, although stating its disagreement with the District 
; 
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Court's conclusion that. the employer's hiring practices were 
a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for refusing to hire 
respondents, premised its disagreement on a view which we 
have discussed and rejected above. It did not conclude that 
the practices were a. pretext for discrimination, but only that 
different practices would have enabled the employer to at least 
consider, and perhaps to hire, more minority employees. But 
courts may not impose such a remedy on an employer at least 
until a violation of Title VII has been proven, and here none 
had been under the reasoning of either the District Court or 
the Court of Appeals. 
C 
The Court of Appeals was also critical of petitioner's effort 
to employ statistics in this type of case. While the matter is 
not free from doubt, it appears the court thought once a 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie showing had been made out, 
statistics of a racially balanced work force were totally irrele-
vant to the question of motive. See 551 F. 2d, at 1089. 
That would undoubt.ably be a correct view of the ma.tter if the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie showing were the equivalent 
of an ultimate finding by the trier of fact that the original 
rejection of the applicant was racially motivated: a raciaUy 
balanced work force canriot immunize an employer from 
liability for specific acts of discrimination. As we said in 
International Brotherhood of 'Teamsters v. United Sta.tes, 
:supra, at 341-343: 
"the District Court and the Court of Appeals found upon 
substantial evidence that the company had engaged in a 
course of discrimination that continued well after the 
effective date of Title VII. The company's later changes 
in its hiring and promotion policies could be of little com-
fort to the victims of the ea.rlier post-Act discrimination, 
and could not erase its previous illegal conduct or its 
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See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 412-
413 (1975.) It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation im-
posed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for 
each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether 
members of thr applicant's race are already proportionately 
r-epresented in th<' work force. See Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., supra, at 430; McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Tra;nsportation 
Co., 427 l!. R. 273. 279 (1976). 
A McDonnell Douglas prima facie showing is not the equiv-
alent of a factual finding of discrimination, however. Rather, 
it is simply proof of actions ta.ken by the employer from which 
we infer discriminatory animus because experience has proved 
that in the absence of any other explanation it is more likely 
than not those actions were bottomed on impermissible con-
siderations. When the prima facie showing is understood in 
this manner, the employer must be allowed some latitude to 
introduce evidence which bears on his motive. Proof that his 
work force was racially balanced or that it contained a dis-
proportionately high percentage of minority employees is not 
wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet 
to be decided. We cannot say that such proof would have 
absolutely no probative value in determining whether the 
otherwise unexplained rejection of the minority applicants was 
discriminatodly motivated. Thus, although we agree with 
the Court of Appeals that in this case such proof neither was 
nor could have been sufficient to conclusively demonstrate 
that Furnco's actions were not discriminatorily motivated, 
the District Court was entitled to consider the racial mix of 
the work force when trying to make the determination as to 
motivation. The Court of Appea.ls should likewise give simi-
lar consideration to the proffered statistical proof in any fur-. 
ther proceedings in this case. 
III 
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alternative theories of liability and defense, 0 none of which 
were directly addressed by the Court of Appeals as we read 
its opinion. Given the present posture of this case, however, 
9 Respondents, for rxample, argue that regardlr:s:s of the propriety of 
Furnco's general refusal to hire at the gate or of a. general policy of hiring 
only bricklayers known to the superintendent or refrrred to him by an 
insider, a forrman or another bricklayer, DaciPs' particula.r method of hiring 
was discriminatory. Thu:s, the general hiring practice, though perhaps 
Iegitima.te in the abstract, wa1:, discriminatorily applied in this case, and 
cannot be used to rebut the prima facio case. Brief for Respondents 
19-26. In particular, respondents a.rgue tha.t the evidence proved that 
Dacies hired from a "list" he had prepared, which allegedly included 
competent fire-bricklayers with whom he had worked, but in fa.ct included 
only white fire-bricklayers with whom he had worked. Exclusion from this 
list of competent blacks with whom he had worked, such as respondents 
Smith and Samuels, was itself discriminatory and thus cannot be m;ed to 
rebut respondents' prima fa.cie casP. 
Furnco, on the other hand, vigorously disputes that Dacies hired only 
from this list and that the hiring process can be as neatly broken clown into 
various components as respondents would like. It. argues that even if most. 
of the people with whom Dacies was familiar were white, Dacies made 11 
concerted effort to speak with people who were familiar with competent 
'black bricklayers and then hired n large number of black bricklayers. In 
fac·t, argues Furnco, the stat.istics indicate that he hired n dispropor-
tionately large number of blacks, thuH clearly indicating that his so-called 
"list" certainly could not. have been the exclusive source of potential 
employees even if it had been all white. It further disputes the notion 
that Furnco or Dncies had in nny way put some sort of ceiling on the 
maximum number of blacks they were willing to hire. It. asserts there is 
absolutely nothing in the record to support such a conclusion. 
The District Court made no findings which would support respondents' 
view of the Pvidence. The Comt of Appeals mentioned the existence of 
such a list, 551 F . 2d, at 1086, but we do not read its opinion as expressly 
1:elying on this point Pither. Rather, as we read its opinion, the court 
found only tha.t respondent;; had made out a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas and that , for t.he reason:,; out.lined in the text., Furnco 
had fail0d to rrbut thnt prima facie case. On remand, respondents are 
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we think those matters which arf' still prE>servNl for revit>w are 
best decided by the Court of Appeals in the tit'st instance. 
Accordingly, we declined to address them as an original mat-
ter here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
,, 
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